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Abstract
This study estimates parameters necessary to calculate the optimal second-best gasoline
tax, most notably the cross-price elasticity between gasoline and leisure.  Prior work indicates
that in a second-best setting with distortionary income taxes, both the cost of environmental
regulation and the optimal environmental tax rate depend crucially on the cross-price elasticity
between a polluting good and leisure.  However, no prior study on second-best environmental
regulation has estimated this elasticity.  Using household data, we find that gasoline is a relative
complement to leisure, and thus that the optimal gasoline tax is significantly higher than marginal
damages–the opposite of the result suggested by the prior literature.  Following this approach to
estimate cross-price elasticities with leisure for other major polluting goods could strongly
influence estimates of optimal environmental taxes.
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I. Introduction
Growing concern about global warming and continuing struggles with local pollution and
congestion have led to increased attention to regulations designed to correct these externalities.
Economists have played an important role in determining the optimal design of these regulations.
Pigou (1938) showed that pollution taxes should be set equal to marginal damage–the level that
fully internalizes an externality.  But the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes changes this
conclusion.  Tullock (1967) first suggested that pollution taxes have an additional benefit besides
improving the environment: the revenue from pollution taxes can replace revenue from pre-
existing distortionary taxes, thus reducing the deadweight loss from those taxes.  This has since
been termed the revenue-recycling effect.  Subsequent work pointed out the tax-interaction effect,
which arises when the pollution tax affects the equilibrium quantity of another taxed good, such
as labor.
1  A tax on the average consumption good leads to a fall in labor supply, because it
lowers the real wage.  In an economy with a pre-existing income tax, the marginal social benefit of
labor exceeds its marginal social cost, and thus that fall in labor supply produces a welfare loss.
The more substitutable the polluting good is for leisure, the larger the fall in labor supply, and
thus the larger the loss.  However, if the polluting good is a complement to leisure, then the
pollution tax will increase labor supply, and this effect will actually yield a welfare gain.
The tax-interaction effect thus depends crucially on the cross-price elasticity between
leisure and the polluting good, as does the optimal pollution tax rate.  But, while prior analytical
work allows this elasticity to take on any value, it has never been estimated; indeed, the extensive
literature on second-best environmental regulation is almost exclusively theoretical and numerical,
with virtually no empirical work.
2  Thus, to calculate the tax-interaction effect for a particular
                                                
1 This literature is far too extensive to provide a comprehensive summary here, but important papers include
Sandmo (1975), Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), Goulder
(1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996 and 1997), Goulder et al. (1999), Parry et al. (1999), and Fullerton and
Metcalf (2001).  These general-equilibrium effects are also important in a variety of non-environmental contexts.
For examples, see Browning (1997) on the welfare cost of monopoly, Goulder and Williams (2003) on the excess
burden of commodity taxes, Parry (1999) on agricultural policy, and Williams (1999) on trade policy.
2 An exception is Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993), which uses empirical estimates to parameterize a computable
general equilibrium model that is then used to study the costs of reducing carbon emissions.  However, that paper
assumed a separable utility function–which, as discussed below, implies that the cross-price elasticity with leisure is
determined by the expenditure elasticity for the polluting good.2
policy, prior studies have needed to impose strong assumptions on the form of the utility
function.  Most assume that the utility function is homothetic and is weakly separable between
leisure and consumption, implying that all goods are average leisure substitutes.  In this case, the
tax-interaction effect yields a welfare loss that exceeds the gain from revenue recycling, and thus
the optimal pollution tax is less than marginal damage.
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These assumptions greatly simplify the analysis, but are highly unlikely to hold in
practice; empirical studies that estimate the joint demand for goods and leisure decisively reject
separability.
4  This issue is not unique to environmental taxes: the effect of this cross-elasticity
on the optimal tax is the same for a non-polluting good.  But even for this broader class of goods,
there are very few empirical studies that estimate optimal taxes–and, to our knowledge, none of
those studies use micro data.
This paper estimates the cross-price elasticity between gasoline and leisure and uses that
estimate to calculate the optimal second-best gasoline tax.  We use data from the 1996 through
1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys, merged with data from the American Chambers of
Commerce Researchers’ Association (ACCRA) cost of living index and the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM model.  This gives us detailed household-level data on
labor supply, taxes, and prices and quantities consumed of gasoline and other goods.
Most commonly used functional forms impose separability, homotheticity, or both; the
linear expenditure system (LES), for example, imposes additive separability, while a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function is both separable and homothetic.  We resolve
this issue by using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) derived by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980).  The AIDS gives a first-order approximation to any demand system, satisfies the axioms
                                                
3 A few studies (e.g., Parry and Small, 2002 and Ballard, Goddeeris, and Kim, 2000) relax the assumption of
homotheticity, but maintain separability, which implies that the cross-price elasticity is determined by the
expenditure elasticity for the polluting good; luxuries are relative leisure substitutes (implying a lower optimal tax),
while necessities are relative leisure substitutes (implying a higher optimal tax).
4  Separability has been tested and rejected in many studies; see, for example, Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976),
Barnett (1979), Blundell and Walker (1982), and Browning and Meghir (1991).  But no prior study offers estimates
of the cross-price elasticity between leisure and a polluting good.  The closest is Diewert and Lawrence (1996),
which uses macro-level data from New Zealand to estimate the cross-price elasticity between motor vehicles and
leisure, but does not consider gasoline or miles driven.3
of choice, is simple to estimate, and does not impose either separability or homotheticity.
We find that the optimal second-best gasoline tax is roughly 35% above marginal external
damage.  In contrast, prior work suggests that second-best optimal pollution taxes are typically
less than marginal external damage.  The difference arises because we find that gasoline is more
complementary to leisure than is the average good, which leads to a substantially higher optimal
tax rate.  One possible explanation for this result is that driving is a relatively time-intensive
good, and time-intensive goods tend to be leisure complements, as suggested by Becker (1965).
Another possible explanation is that the demand for leisure driving is much more elastic than the
demand for commuting.  In either case, our results suggest that the widely used assumptions of
separability and homotheticity are not merely convenient simplifications, but can substantially
affect policy conclusions.  Perhaps more importantly, we show that these effects can be
estimated, and provide a theoretical and empirical framework for doing so.
The next section of this paper develops a simple theoretical model and derives an
expression for the optimal second-best environmental tax.  Subsequent sections describe the
empirical model, data, estimation results, and the implied optimal environmental tax.  The final
section presents conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
II. A Theoretical Model
This section presents a simple theoretical model and uses it to derive an expression for
the optimal second-best environmental tax.  This model is similar to those used in the prior
literature, but, unlike most earlier work, does not assume that leisure is separable, that the utility
function is homothetic, or that the polluting good is an average substitute for leisure.  It also
differs from prior models in that it allows for multiple households (and the possibility of
multiple individuals in a household), rather than a representative agent.
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5 Recent papers that use a similar model, but assume homotheticity and separability in deriving optimal taxes
include Goulder et al. (1999), Parry et al. (1999), and Williams (2001).  Parry and Small (2002) and Ballard et al.
(2000) relax the assumption of homotheticity, but maintain separability.  Kim (2002) provides a theoretical model
that derives an expression for the optimal pollution tax without imposing separability or homotheticity, but does
not include any empirical estimates using that expression.  All of these papers assume a representative agent. As is
briefly discussed in the next section, the aggregate demands in our system do not equal the demand of a
representative household.  Thus, we need to allow for multiple households in this theoretical model.  While this
model could also be used to study distributional effects, we do not consider that issue in this paper.4
Each household in the economy consumes a dirty consumption good (D), a clean good
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where U is continuous and quasi-concave and the function φ
h represents the disutility from an
externality associated with the economy-wide total consumption of the dirty good.
6  The
elements l
hi of the vector l
h represent hours of leisure for each of the adults in the household.
The time constraint for individual i is
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where L  is the time endowment and L












where w is the after-tax wage, I is after-tax non-labor income, and Y
h is total after-tax income,
which equals total expenditure.  The consumer price of the dirty good (pD) is given by
 (4) pD
h = p  D
h + τD,
where p  D is the producer price and τD is a unit tax on the dirty good.  The clean good is untaxed,
and thus its producer price ( p  C) and consumer price ( pC) are equal.
7  The after-tax wage is
(5) w
hi = w 
hi −τL
hi,
where w  is the pre-tax wage and τL is the marginal tax per unit of labor.  After-tax non-labor
income is given by
(6) I
h = I 
h −T
h,
 where I  is pre-tax non-labor income, and T is a lump-sum tax or transfer.
8
                                                
6 We assume that the damage from the externality appears only as an additively separable term in utility.  If
damages were to enter in some other form, that could also affect labor supply and thus generate a second-best
welfare effect.  See Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Espinosa and Smith (2001), and Williams (2002 and
2003) for further discussion on this point.  The present paper focuses on whether the polluting good is separable in
utility, and thus ignores the question of whether damages are separable.
7 Assuming that the clean good is untaxed leads to no loss of generality, because any tax system that taxes the clean
good can be renormalized as a system with a higher income tax and no clean good tax (see, for example, Fullerton
1997).  Williams (2001) shows that this renormalization does not affect the ratio of the optimal environmental tax
to marginal damages.
8 Note that τL and T could represent a linear tax system or a (household-specific) local linear approximation to a
nonlinear tax system.5
Each of the three goods is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to
scale.  We assume that non-labor income is derived from ownership of a fixed factor that is a
perfect substitute for labor.
9  These assumptions imply that the pre-tax wage and all producer
prices are exogenously fixed and that the aggregate production constraint is
(7) I 
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The level of the public good is assumed to be fixed, with any change in revenue from the dirty
good tax offset by adjusting τL and T, following
(9) τL
hi = ˆ  τ  L
hi + τY w 
hi − ˆ  τ  L
hi ()  and Τ
h = ˆ  T 
h + τY I 
h − ˆ  T 
h () ,
where  ˆ  τ  L
hi and  ˆ  T 
h are constant, and τY adjusts to hold government revenue constant as τD varies.
Equation (9) implies that the reduction in household h’s taxes from a decrease in τY will be
proportional to Y
h.  This could represent adjusting a broad-based consumption tax, renormalized
as an income tax, or could represent an income tax cut that is proportional to after-tax income.
10
Each household maximizes utility (1) subject to its time constraint (2) and budget
constraint (3), taking as given prices, tax rates, the level of the public good, and the level of















h is the marginal utility of after-tax income.  Together with the constraints given
                                                
9 This assumption is clearly unrealistic, but it provides a simple way to introduce non-labor income into the model.
For a similar model in which the fixed factor is not a perfect substitute for labor, see Williams (2002).  Bovenberg
and Goulder (1996) provide a model with non-labor income derived from capital, but it is much more complex than
the model used here, and therefore cannot be solved analytically.
10 We choose this approach for adjusting the income tax because it implies that raising the dirty good tax and
lowering the income tax will not shift the tax burden from labor to non-labor income or vice-versa.  In this model, a
tax on non-labor income is nondistortionary, because we represent non-labor income as lump-sum.  But in the real
world, taxes on non-labor income are distortionary, and thus we do not want the model’s results to be driven by the
effect of shifting the tax burden onto or off of non-labor income.  The results would be similar if the added revenue
were used to purchase more of the public good, as long as the level of the public good is close to the optimum.6

















To derive an expression for the aggregate change in utility from a change in the tax on the
dirty good, we take the total derivative of utility (1) with respect to τD, sum over households,
substitute in the first-order conditions (10), subtract the total derivatives with respect to τD of
































∂D h ∑ .
Expression (12) equals the change in deadweight loss in the two distorted markets: the
distortion in the dirty good market  τD −τP ()  times the change in dirty good consumption, plus the
distortion in the labor market  τL ()  times the change in labor supply.  Note that this is a pure
efficiency measure; distributional issues, while important, are beyond the scope of this paper.
The total derivatives in (12) include not only the effect of the increase in the dirty good
tax, but also the effect of the resulting income tax cut.  This makes little difference for the dirty
good, where the effect of the income tax change will be tiny relative to the effect of the dirty good
tax, but will be much more important for labor supply.  Thus, it is useful to rewrite the term for
the labor market in (12) in terms of ∂l ∂pD  rather than dl dpD .  To do this, we first define η,
which is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF).  As shown in Appendix 1, η is given by
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This is the marginal cost to households of raising government revenue via the income tax; thus, it
is the ratio of the loss to households to the revenue raised for a marginal increase in this tax.
11
                                                
11 This definition of the MCPF is “non-environmental” in that it omits the effects of changes in environmental
quality and changes in revenue from the environmental tax resulting from a change in the income tax.  This
expression for the MCPF and those typically used in the prior literature differ slightly because of differences in
model assumptions.  They are equivalent for the special case of this model that matches the typical assumptions in
the prior literature: only one household, only one individual in that household, and no non-labor income.7






























To obtain an expression for the optimum tax on the dirty good, set (12) equal to zero,




























The first term in this expression is the traditional Pigouvian tax divided by the marginal
cost of public funds.  This is the optimal tax when the dirty good is an average substitute for
leisure.  The second term shows the influence of the cross-price elasticity between the dirty good
and leisure.  When the dirty good is a stronger substitute for leisure than is the average good, this
term is negative and thus decreases the optimal tax on the polluting good.  If the dirty good is a
weaker leisure substitute than the average good or is a complement to leisure, this term is positive
and thus increases the optimal tax.
The prior literature typically assumes that utility is homothetic and that leisure is
separable.  This greatly simplifies the analysis, because it implies that the two terms in square
brackets in (16) cancel, and therefore that the optimal tax is just τP η.  Thus, these assumptions
eliminate the need to estimate the cross-price elasticity between the dirty good and leisure.
Parry and Small (2002) and Ballard et al. (2000) relax the assumption of homotheticity,
but still assume that leisure is separable in utility.  This assumption allows the derivative of







































where εDX  is the expenditure elasticity of demand for gasoline.  Under this assumption, a luxury
must be a relative substitute for leisure, while a necessity must be a relative complement to
leisure. Thus, this assumption also makes it possible to calculate the optimal pollution tax
without directly estimating the cross-price elasticity between the dirty good and leisure.8
III.  An Empirical Model
The optimal tax on the dirty good in (16) depends on several own-price and cross-price
derivatives of demand.  In this section, we first specify the demand system that we use to
estimate these derivatives. Then we describe the data, variable derivation, and summary statistics.
Finally, we discuss the estimation technique and system estimation results. 
A.  Specification of the Demand System
We use an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), first derived in Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980), defined over gasoline (the dirty good), leisure, and a composite of all other goods (the
clean good). The advantages of the AIDS are well-known: it provides a first-order approximation
to any demand system, satisfies the axioms of choice, and does not assume that the utility
function is separable or homothetic.
In their budget share form, the AIDS demand equations for gasoline, leisure, and a
composite of all other goods for household h are:
(18) sj
h =α j
h + γ jklog pk




∑     j, k = gasoline, leisure, other goods; h = 1, …,H
where α, β , and  γ  are parameters to be estimated, and y
h is full income, or total expenditures on
gasoline, leisure, and other goods.
12  P
h  is the price index defined by:
(19) logP
h =α0 + α j
















∑ =1           (20b)  γ jk
j
∑ = 0          (20c)  β j
j
∑ = 0          (20d) γ jk = γkj.
Under these restrictions, (18) represents a system of demand functions that add up to full
income, are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and full income, and satisfy Slutsky symmetry.
Use of the price index in (19) requires estimation of a nonlinear system of equations. To
simplify estimation, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) suggests a linear approximation to (19):
                                                
12  Please note the slight change in notation. The theory model assigned letters D, l, and C to the goods for
consistency with the prior second-best literature. For compactness, this section uses subscript j to index goods.
Also note that full income (y
h) as defined here differs from income (Y
h) as defined in the theory model, in that y
h








This price index, however, is not invariant to changes in units of measurement (see Moschini
1995). We therefore normalize prices to obtain the unit-invariant price index
(22)  logP
h ≅ sj
h log p j
h p  j ()
j
∑ ,
where  p  j is the mean price over all households.
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B. Data, Variable Derivation, and Summary Statistics
The 1996 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys are the main components of our
data. The CEX Family Interview files include the amount spent by each household on gasoline,
total expenditures, and a wide variety of household income measures, all for the three months
prior to the CEX interview. For each household member, the Member Files include usual weekly
work hours, occupation, the gross amount of last pay, the duration of the last pay period, and a
variety of member income measures. The CEX is a rotating panel survey. Each quarter, 20
percent of the sample is rotated out and replaced by new consumer units. We pool observations
for households across quarters.
We estimate two demand systems: one for one-adult households and the other for two-
adult households with one adult male and one adult female (where an adult is at least 18 years of
age).
14  Each adult’s leisure is treated as a separate good.  Thus, the two-adult demand system
includes four goods: gasoline, male leisure, female leisure, and a composite of all other goods.  The
twelve quarters in the 1996 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys have 4659 one-adult
households and 5047 two-adult households under 65 with complete records of the necessary
variables.  Each household appears in the data one to four times, giving a total of 9725 one-adult
observations and 11034 two-adult observations. Females head 54 percent of the one-adult
                                                
13 Note that the use of any linear approximation to the price index in (19) implies that the symmetry restriction
(20d) is also an approximation.
14 We exclude households with adults over the age of 65.  Less than 5 percent of those over 65 work, and thus non-
labor income is very important for this group.  We do not realistically model capital income, as discussed in
Section II.  Thus, excluding those over 65 likely introduces much less error than would including this group.10
households. In one adult households, 78 percent of women and 83 percent of men work. In two-
adult households, 71 percent of women and 88 percent of men work.
Full income (y
h) equals the amount spent on gasoline, leisure, and all other goods. The
CEX contains quarterly gasoline expenditure. Since it also contains hours worked per week, we
divide quarterly gasoline expenditure by 13 to get weekly gas expenditure. To derive weekly
leisure “expenditure,” we need to specify each person’s time endowment. The highest number of
hours worked in the sample is 90 per week, so we set the weekly time endowment at 90 hours.
We then subtract the number of hours worked per week from 90 to get weekly leisure hours.
15
To obtain the price of leisure (the wage) we first calculate the wage net of tax using state
and federal effective tax rates from the NBER’s TAXSIM model.
16 Since we do not observe
wages for individuals who do not work, we follow Heckman (1979) to correct for selectivity bias.
We explain this estimation in more detail in Appendix 2. We multiply the selectivity-corrected
net wage by the number of hours of leisure per week to obtain weekly leisure expenditure.
To calculate weekly spending on other goods, we first convert the CEX’s measure of
quarterly total expenditures into weekly total expenditures. Then we subtract weekly gasoline
expenditure from total weekly expenditures to obtain spending on all other goods.
For gas prices and the price of other goods, we use the ACCRA cost-of-living index. This
index compiles prices of many separate goods as well as overall price levels for approximately
300 cities in the United States. It is most widely used to calculate differences in overall cost-of-
living across cities. It also lists for each quarter the average prices of regular, unleaded, national-
brand gasoline. Since the CEX reports state of residence of each household, and not city, we
average the city prices within each state to obtain a state gasoline price and price index for each
                                                
15 Demand system estimates can be sensitive to the choice of time endowment. We therefore experimented with
time endowments of 100 and 112 hours per week. In neither case do the results change significantly.
16 Estimates of marginal and average tax rates should be reasonably accurate given the level of detail in the
TAXSIM model, which incorporates state and federal tax brackets, the earned income tax credit, the child tax credit,
deductibility of state income taxes, and other important features of the tax code. Some of these features, such as
credit phase-outs, may cause the marginal tax rate to differ from the statutory marginal rate. Therefore, marginal tax
rates are calculated based on a $1000 increase in earned income. For more detail on the TAXSIM model, see
Feenberg and Coutts (1993).  These tax rate estimates, however, do not include sales taxes or Social Security
payroll taxes, and thus will understate the true tax rate.  Consequently, our results will tend to understate the
importance of second-best effects.11
calendar quarter. Then we assign a gas price and a price index to each household based on state of
residence and CEX quarter.  For households whose CEX quarters overlap two quarters of price
data, we use a weighted average of those two quarters. We use the ACCRA price index divided
by 100 as our price of other goods.  We calculate the price index (P
h) using equation (22).
Table 1 lists summary statistics for the demand system estimation sample, working
households that consume gasoline. Both one- and two-adult households spend about 2 percent of
their income on gasoline. One-adult households spend a bit less than 50 percent of their total
income on leisure and the remainder on other goods. Two-adult households spend about 55
percent of their income on leisure and the remainder on other goods. The average selectivity-
corrected net wage is $8.31 per hour in the one-adult sample, and $11.02 per hour for men and
$8.60 per hour for women in the two-adult sample.
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C. System Estimation and Results
To incorporate the effect that household and individual specific characteristics have on
demand, we add a vector of these characteristics, cr
h, to the constant terms in (18) so that:
(23) α j
h =ζ j0 + ζ jrcr
h
r
∑ , j = gasoline, leisure, other goods
where ζ j0 and the ζ jr’s  are parameters to be estimated.
Some households also have zero expenditure on gasoline. To correct for the selection bias
that may arise, we first estimate a probit on the choice of whether to consume gasoline. From
that probit, we obtain inverse Mills ratios (Rg
h) for gasoline (see Appendix 2 for details on this
estimation). Substituting equation (23) into equation (18) and adding Rg
h and error term e j
h yield
the following equations for estimation:
(24) sj
h =ζ j0 + ζ jrcr
h
r
∑ + γ jk log pk





h + e j
h.
We estimate the demand system defined by (24) using working households that consume
gasoline, separately for one-adult and two-adult households. We impose the restrictions in (20a-
                                                
17  The wage distribution in our sample closely follows the distribution in the 1997 Current Population Survey.12
d) and drop the equation for other goods.  Each system includes member and household
characteristics that may affect gasoline or leisure shares: the members’ age, age squared, race, sex
(in one-adult estimation only), education, and number of children.
18  In addition, a wide range of
local factors could affect gasoline use or work behavior–everything from availability of public
transportation to local urban design to cultural differences.  Because many of these factors are
unmeasurable, we include state fixed effects to account for them.  Finally, because gasoline
demand varies throughout the year, we include fixed effects for the month of the CEX interview.
Under this approach, the own-price gas demand elasticity is identified primarily based on
differences across states in quarter-to-quarter gas price variation, because cross-state variation is
picked up by the state fixed effects and month-to-month variation by the month fixed effects.
The own-price and cross-price labor supply elasticities are identified primarily by cross-section
variation in wages within each state.
19  This requires the implicit assumption that unobserved
household characteristics are not correlated both with wages and with gasoline consumption or
hours worked.
Because some regressors may be endogenous, we use instrumental variables techniques.
The net wage, for example, may be endogenous for two reasons.  First, the gross wage is
determined by dividing earnings by hours of work, and both variables may be measured with
error.  Thus, hours worked and wage rates may be correlated.  Second, the marginal income tax
rate depends on income. We therefore use the mean net wage by occupation by state, calculated
separately for men and for women, to instrument for the net wage.
20
The real income term ln(y
h/P
h) may also be endogenous, because it is a function of
                                                
18 Note that the probits used to correct for selectivity bias include at least one variable not included in demand
system estimation.  West (2004) uses a similar data set to estimate the demand for vehicle miles traveled and finds
that accounting for vehicle type results in less elastic demand.  We do not account for vehicle type in this paper.
The more inelastic is demand for gasoline, the farther the optimal tax will be from the standard second-best result.
19 It might therefore seem that we estimate long run labor supply elasticities and short run gas demand elasticties.
But since the coefficients in the demand system are estimated jointly, none of our elasticities is strictly short-run or
long-run.
20 Observations for workers in two occupation categories (farming, forestry, fishing, and groundskeeping is the first
and the armed forces the second) are spread very thinly across states. For workers with these occupations, we
instrument for net wage with the national mean net wages by occupation rather than the state level means.13
individual-specific shares that are also dependent variables.  We instrument for this term, using a
price index obtained by replacing the individual-specific shares in (22) with the sample mean
shares.
21  Gasoline prices may also be endogenous. In the absence of a good instrument for state-
level gas prices, however, we do not control for this potential endogeneity.
22
Since the equations in (24) are functions of the same explanatory variables, we expect
error terms among the equations to be correlated.  We therefore estimate the demand system
using three-stage least squares (3SLS).  This enables us to impose the cross-equation restrictions
in equations (20a-d), use instrumental variables to obtain consistent estimates, and use
generalized least squares to account for the error correlation structure across equations.
23
Tables 2 and 3 present the system estimation results along with standard errors based on
1500 replications of a nonparametric bootstrap. Each bootstrap replication recomputes the
Heckman-corrected wage and the inverse Mills ratios from the discrete choice of whether to
consume gasoline, as well as the regression coefficients. Thus, the standard error estimates
incorporate variation in the estimated selectivity-corrected wages and inverse Mills ratios.
Because observations for the same household for multiple quarters are not independent, we
cluster observations by household in generating each bootstrap sample.
In the one-adult sample, the gasoline share decreases with the wage rate.  It is higher for
blacks, males, and those with less education or more children. The leisure share decreases with
the wage and the price of the other good, and increases with the price of gas. It is lower for blacks
and those with less education or more children. The two-adult estimates generally mirror the one-
adult estimates, though the magnitudes differ. The share of leisure (for either adult) increases with
                                                
21 We also estimate our system using the real income term calculated using this alternative index (keeping the wage
instrument but with no price instrument), which does not noticeably affect any of the results.   Using estimates
from running the demand system with no instruments whatsoever also does not noticeably affect the results.
22 Because we include state fixed effects, state-level gas tax rates are poor instruments for gas prices; in our sample,
they explain only about 1 percent of the variation in gas prices.
23 In principle, the full econometric model, including all discrete and continuous choices, might be estimated using
maximum likelihood, but this would be difficult to implement. Since censoring occurs in both gasoline and leisure
demand, and for either or both the male and female in two-adult households, we would need to evaluate multiple
integrals in the likelihood function. Furthermore, such a procedure would probably be too computationally intensive
to be practical, given that we need to bootstrap standard errors for our elasticity and optimal tax estimates.14
his or her wage and decreases with the wage of the other adult in the household.
Tables 4 and 5 present elasticities for the one-adult and two-adult samples, respectively,
along with bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals.  These elasticities are calculated
separately for each household and then aggregated, rather than being calculated for a
representative household.
24  Compensated own-price gas and other good demand elasticities are
negative, and compensated own-wage labor elasticities are positive.  Gasoline own-price
elasticity estimates are roughly –0.75 for one-adult households and -0.27 for two-adult
households, which fall in the span of estimates reported in gas demand surveys.
25
For one-adult households, the compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities
are 0.35 and 0.04, respectively. For two-adult households, compensated own-wage labor supply
elasticities are 0.19 for men and 0.34 for women, while uncompensated elasticities are 0.06 and
0.24. These fall into the range reported in the survey by Fuchs et al. (1998).  Compensated cross-
wage labor elasticities are insignificantly positive, while uncompensated elasticities are negative;
men and women respond to increases in their partner’s wage by working less.
The other important elasticity in equation (16) is the uncompensated cross-price
elasticity of labor with respect to the price of gasoline.  A positive value for this elasticity raises
the optimal gas tax, because in this case an increase in the price of gasoline increases labor supply
and generates a second-best welfare gain.  A negative value reverses this effect, lowering the
optimal tax.  The prior literature has implicitly assumed a slightly negative value for this
elasticity, as a result of assuming separability and homogeneity.  In contrast, we find that this
elasticity is positive for one-adult households and for both genders in two-adult households,
though it is significant only for men in two-adult households (an elasticity of 0.013).  This
implies a higher optimal gas tax rate than has been suggested by prior work.
One possible explanation for this result is that a higher gas price leads to a reduction in
                                                
24 In many cases, aggregate demand elasticities under the AIDS are equal to the elasticity for a representative
household, but that property does not hold when some households are at a corner solution, as is the case here.
Thus, it is necessary to aggregate individual household elasticities.  Appendix 1 provides equations for the
household demand elasticities in terms of the estimated parameters and for elasticity aggregation.
25 See Dahl and Sterner (1991) or Espey (1996).15
leisure driving that is substantially greater than the reduction in work-related driving (primarily
commuting).  Parry and Small (2002) note that commuting makes up less than half of all vehicle
miles traveled in the US, and it is reasonable to think that the demand for leisure driving would be
more elastic than the demand for work-related driving.  A more sophisticated argument is that
driving is a relatively time-intensive activity (at the margin, once households have incurred the
fixed cost of buying a car).  Becker’s (1965) model of time use suggests that time-intensive goods
are complements to leisure (or, more precisely, to non-market time).
This result is sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects: dropping the state fixed
effects switches the sign on the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the gas price from
positive (meaning gas and leisure are complements) to negative (gas and leisure are substitutes).
This suggests that unobserved state-level variables are quite important.  In contrast, dropping
month fixed effects has little effect on the results.
IV.  Optimal Tax Calculations
This section calculates the optimal second-best gasoline tax rate and compares it to the
rates implied by the two formulas from the prior literature: one that assumes separability and
homotheticity, and one that assumes only separability.
Our data set provides values for most of the variables in the formulas for the optimal tax
rate (16) and the marginal cost of public funds (14), while the estimates from the previous section
allow us to calculate all of the necessary derivatives of demand.
26  The only additional parameter
value needed is the marginal external damage from gasoline.  We take this value from Parry and
Small (2002), who estimate marginal damages at 83 cents per gallon in year 2000 dollars, a figure
that incorporates pollution, congestion and accident externalities.  To make this number
                                                
26 We assume that the derivatives of demand at the optimum are the same as those present in the status quo (which
are what we estimated).  In addition, equation (16) depends on the total derivative of gasoline demand with respect
to the gas tax.  This derivative is neither strictly uncompensated (because the total derivative includes the effect of
reducing the income tax) nor strictly compensated (because the income tax cut does not fully compensate for the
increased gas tax).  However, as long as the tax rates are relatively small, this total derivative will be very close to
the compensated derivative, and thus we use that value.  Finally, for consistency with the model in Section II,
where the externality was associated exclusively with a final good, we assume that the tax is imposed only on
consumer use of gasoline, not on gasoline used as an intermediate good.  Parry and Small (2002) note that
intermediate use of gasoline is only a very small share of the total, so this seems like a reasonable assumption.16
consistent with the rest of our data, we use the CPI to deflate it, yielding an estimate of 77 cents
in 1997 dollars, which we assume remains constant as the gas tax rate changes.
Substituting the appropriate values into equation (14) yields estimates for the MCPF of
1.01 in the one-adult sample, 1.03 in the two-adult sample, and 1.02 in the full sample.  These
estimates are somewhat lower than the values for the MCPF used by the prior literature, for two
reasons.  First, our estimate of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is slightly lower than
the prior literature had assumed.  Second, marginal tax rates in our data are somewhat lower than
what the prior literature has assumed (at least partly because, as noted previously, our tax rate
data include only income taxes, omitting sales taxes and payroll taxes).  For comparison, Goulder
et al. (1999) and Parry et al. (1999) assume an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.15 and
a tax rate of 40%, which together imply an MCPF of 1.11.
The now-standard formula from the prior literature, which assumes that utility is
homothetic and separable, states that the optimal second-best tax is equal to marginal damages
divided by the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF).  This would imply a gas tax of $0.76 per
gallon in the one-adult sample, $0.75 in the two-adult sample, and $0.75 for the full sample.
Relaxing the assumption of homotheticity but keeping separability gives a somewhat
higher optimal tax, as in Parry and Small (2002).  Substituting (17) and the appropriate parameter
values into (16) yields an optimal tax of $0.87 for the one-adult sample, $1.01 for the two-adult
sample, and $0.93 for the full sample–all significantly above marginal damages. Because gasoline
is a necessity, equation (17) implies that it is a relative leisure complement.  Thus, increasing the
gasoline tax decreases labor supply by less than an equivalent increase in the tax on other goods,
implying a smaller loss from the tax interaction effect and a higher optimal tax rate.
Relaxing both separability and homotheticity gives the optimal tax formula from equation
(16).  When we substitute the appropriate parameter estimates into (16), we get a second-best
optimal gasoline tax of $0.82 in the one-adult sample, $1.30 in the two-adult sample, and $1.04
per gallon for the full sample.  The difference between this rate and marginal damages is
statistically significant at the 95% level for either the two-adult sample or the full sample, as is
the difference between this rate and the optimal tax assuming both separability and17
homotheticity.  The difference from the optimal tax assuming only separability is significant at
the 90% level.  Our estimates suggest that increasing the gasoline tax will actually increase labor
supply, which implies that the tax-interaction effect will actually generate a welfare gain, rather
than the loss suggested by the prior literature. Thus, the optimal tax rate is higher.
The difference between the optimal second-best tax and marginal external damage–a
difference of 27 cents per gallon (35% of marginal damages) for the full sample–is not enormous,
but is quite important.  And this difference has the opposite sign from what the prior literature
has suggested.  That literature has certainly noted the theoretical possibility that the optimal tax
may exceed marginal damage, for exactly the reasons found here, but gave no clear indication of
how likely such an outcome might be or of how large the difference would be.
Comparing the impact of including second-best effects with and without assuming
separability and homotheticity demonstrates the importance of these assumptions.  Given these
point estimates, the difference caused by relaxing the assumptions of separability and
homotheticity (a rise from $0.75 to $1.04 in the optimal tax) is more than ten times as large as the
difference caused by incorporating second-best effects in the first place ($0.77 to $0.75)–the
difference that has been the primary focus of the literature thus far.
Finally, we consider whether raising the gas tax would yield a “double dividend”: that is,
if it would produce a welfare gain even if marginal external damage were zero.  Substituting a
value of zero for τP in (16) yields an estimated optimal tax of $0.28.  This suggests the existence
of a double dividend from raising the gas tax above zero, but not from raising it above the average
rate in our sample ($0.34).  However, the 95% confidence interval for the optimal tax in this case
runs from $0.11 to $0.72, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that raising the gas tax would yield
a double dividend–or, to put it differently, that the optimal gas tax would exceed the current rate
even if there were no externalities associated with gasoline use.
V.  Conclusions
This paper estimates a complete consumer demand system without imposing separability
or homotheticity, and applies those estimates together with a simple theoretical model to18
calculate the second-best optimal tax on gasoline.  Contrary to the prior literature, which suggests
that optimal environmental taxes are less than marginal external damage, we find that the optimal
tax substantially exceeds marginal damage.  The difference arises because gasoline is more
complementary to leisure than is the average good, while typical assumptions in the prior
literature imply that the polluting good is an average substitute for leisure.
This result has important implications both for policy and for future research.  One
obvious implication is that the efficiency gain from increasing the gas tax would be even larger
than a first-best analysis would indicate.  However, given the necessary simplifications in the
model (most notably that it ignores capital), some caution should be exercised in drawing policy
conclusions from this result.  Perhaps more importantly, the practical relevance of any result on
optimal gasoline taxes is limited by political constraints; the existing tax in the U.S. is far below
what almost any economic analysis would indicate as the optimum.
Our result also has implications for the general problem of setting environmental taxes in a
second-best world.  Some readers may be tempted to use our results to support setting other
environmental taxes at levels above marginal damages.  This conclusion does not necessarily
follow, given that other polluting goods are used for very different purposes than is gasoline.  But
our result does show that the case in which tax-interaction effects cause the optimal tax to exceed
marginal damages is relevant in practice, not merely a theoretical possibility.  This indicates far
more uncertainty about the influence of second-best effects on environmental policy than prior
work has suggested, and it shows that the widely used separability and homotheticity
assumptions are not merely convenient simplifications; they can have large effects on the results.
Perhaps more importantly, we show that it is possible to estimate empirically the
influence of these assumptions on the second-best optimal environmental tax, and we provide the
necessary empirical and theoretical framework to do so.  This approach can be fruitfully applied
not only to other polluting goods, but also to non-polluting goods, to yield better estimates of
optimal tax rates and of the deadweight losses from taxes on these goods.19
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Gasoline per Week (gallons) 13.78 10.97 24.67 16.07
One-adult Hours per Week 41.25 10.92 --
Two-adult Male Hours per Week -- 44.76 10.34
Two-adult Female Hours per Week -- 37.54 11.09
Gasoline Share of Expenditures .02 .01 .02 .01
One-adult Leisure Share of Expenditures .49 .11 --
Two-adult Male Leisure Share of Expenditures -- .29 .09
Two-adult Female Leisure Share of Expenditures -- .26 .07
Other Good Share of Expenditures .50 .15 .44 .12
Gas Price ($) 1.19 .12 1.19 .11
Other Good Price (index) 1.04 .10 1.04 .11
One-adult Heckman-Corrected Net Wage ($) 8.31 2.36 --
Two-adult Male Heckman-Corrected Net Wage ($) -- 11.02 3.26
Two-adult Female Heckman-Corrected Net Wage ($) -- 8.60 2.20
ln(y/P) 5.72 .50 6.23 .45
One-Adult Age (years) 37.2 11.4 --
Two-Adult Male Age (years) -- 38.5 10.0
Two-Adult Female Age (years) -- 37.0 9.5
One-Adult Education:  < High School Diploma (%) 6.8 - --
One-Adult Education: High School Diploma (%) 23.3 - --
One-Adult Education: > High School Diploma (%) 69.9 - --
Two-Adult Male Education: < High School Diploma (%) -- 8.5 -
Two-Adult Male Education: High School Diploma (%) -- 27.9 -
Two-Adult Male Education: > High School Diploma (%) -- 63.6 -
Two-Adult Female Education: < High School Diploma (%) -- 6.8
Two-Adult Female Education: High School Diploma (%) -- 26.9 -
Two-Adult Female Education: > High School Diploma (%) -- 66.4 -
Race of Household Head
White (%) 82.6 - 87.5 -
Black (%) 13.7 - 8.8 -
Asian (%) .7 - .8 -
Other race (%) 3.0 - 2.9 -
Number of Children .41 .87 1.16 1.18
Region
Northeast (%) 13.3 - 13.3 -
Midwest (%) 24.5 - 25.8 -
South (%) 34.1 - 35.5 -
West (%) 28.1 - 25.4 -
Observations 6553 - 7162 -
* Of the one-adult households 46% are headed by males while 54% are headed by females.23
Table 2: One-adult Household Demand System Estimation Results*
Gas Share Leisure Share
ln(gas price) 0.0038 -0.0047
(0.0026) (0.0017)
ln(other good price) 0.0009 -0.1071
(0.0030) (0.0163)














Other Race 0.0003 -0.0483
(0.0014) (0.0241)
High School Degree -0.0059 0.1147
(0.0014) (0.0201)








Number of Observations 6553 6553
* These are 3SLS regressions with ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state) instruments for ln(net wage) and ln(y/P)
calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for ln(y/P) calculated using
individual-specific shares. All regressions include state and month dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are
in parentheses.24
Table 3: Two-adult Household Demand System Estimation Results*
Gas ShareM ale Leisure Female Leisure
ln(gas price) 0.0102 -0.0061 -0.0031
(0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0009)
ln(other good price) -0.0011 -0.0604 -0.0491
(0.0020) (0.0094) (0.0075)
ln(male net wage) -0.0061 0.1383 -0.0717
(0.0010) (0.0086) (0.0052)
ln(female net wage) -0.0031 -0.0717 0.1239
(0.0009) (0.0052) (0.0069)
ln(y/P) -0.0090 -0.1687 -0.1694
(0.0006) (0.0067) (0.0050)
Inverse Mills Ratio (gasoline) -0.0168 0.1820 0.1653
(0.0024) (0.0269) (0.0212)
Male Age 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Male Age Squared -0.000003 0.000007 -0.000004
(0.000002) (0.000020) (0.000014)
Black Male -0.0006 -0.0119 -0.0091
(0.0015) (0.0147) (0.0127)
Asian Male -0.0011 0.0189 0.0012
(0.0018) (0.0149) (0.0146)
Other Race Male 0.0002 -0.0243 0.0087
(0.0014) (0.0110) (0.0100)
Male High School Degree -0.0020 0.0132 0.0035
(0.0010) (0.0064) (0.0048)
Male More than High School Degree -0.0022 0.0192 0.0067
(0.0011) (0.0076) (0.0052)
Female Age 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0031
(0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Female Age Squared -0.000005 -0.000006 0.000042
(0.000002) (0.000016) (0.000016)
Black Female 0.0002 -0.0090 -0.0096
(0.0016) (0.0149) (0.0132)
Asian Female 0.0016 0.0037 -0.0218
(0.0021) (0.0237) (0.0110)
Other Race Female -0.0019 0.0235 -0.0124
(0.0013) (0.0103) (0.0099)
Female High School Degree 0.0004 -0.0044 0.0103
(0.0009) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Female more than High School Degree 0.0004 -0.0032 0.0205
(0.0010) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Number of Children 0.0004 -0.0019 0.0075
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Constant 0.0904 1.3480 1.4282
(0.0054) (0.0565) (0.0444)
Observations 7162 7162 7162
* These are 3SLS regressions with ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state) instruments for ln(net wage) and ln(y/P)
calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for ln(y/P) calculated using individual-
specific shares. All regressions include state and month dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.25
 Table 4:  One-Adult Elasticities
Compensated Price Elasticities
  Gas Price Wage Other Good Price
     
Gasoline- 0.750 0.180 0.586
  (-1.095 -0.457) (0.006 0.355) (0.255 0.935)
  
Labor -0.009 0.353 -0.296
  (-0.017 -0.001) (0.261 0.459) (-0.384 -0.217)
  
Other Good 0.0163 0.203 -0.209
  (0.008 0.028) (0.115 0.229) (-0.242 -0.135)
     
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
  Gas Price Wage Other Good Price
     
Gasoline- 0.771 0.305 0.455
  (-1.088 -0.479) (0.131 0.474) (0.084 1.094)
  
Labor 0.003 0.040 0.024
  (-0.005 0.011) (-0.066 0.168) (-0.074 0.128)
  
Other Good -0.005 0.621 -1.009
  (-0.014 0.005) (0.356 0.665) (-1.075 -0.947)
Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses, based on 1500 replications of a
nonparametric clustered bootstrap.26
Table 5:  Two-Adult Elasticities
Compensated Price Elasticities
  Gas PriceM ale Wage Female Wage Other Good Price
        
Gasoline- 0.269 -0.123 0.042 0.354
  (-0.538 -0.011) (-0.269 0.003) (-0.051 0.140) (0.061 0.639)
  
Male 0.007 0.187 0.012 -0.181
Labor (0.000 0.015) (0.105 0.272) (-0.018 0.042) (-0.256 -0.096)
  
Female -0.005 0.028 0.337 -0.321
Labor (-0.016 0.005) (-0.030 0.087) (0.252 0.427) (-0.415 -0.241)
  
Other 0.012 0.102 0.095 -0.201
Good (0.002 0.021) (0.048 0.141) (0.070 0.123) (-0.255 -0.134)
 
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
  Gas PriceM ale Wage Female Wage Other Good Price
        
Gasoline- 0.283 0.011 0.110 0.178
  (-0.540 -0.021) (-0.133 0.134) (0.020 0.213) (-0.285 0.646)
  
Male 0.013 0.062 -0.049 -0.045
Labor (0.006 0.022) (-0.019 0.152) (-0.080 -0.019) (-0.126 0.043)
  
Female 0.002 -0.113 0.242 -0.165
Labor (-0.008 0.013) (-0.174 -0.055) (0.158 0.329) (-0.252 -0.076)
  
Other- 0.016 0.548 0.328 -1.090
Good (-0.026 -0.007) (0.314 0.588) (0.295 0.362) (-1.154 -1.003)
Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses, based on 1500 replications of a
nonparametric clustered bootstrap.27
Table 6:  Estimated Optimal Tax Rates
(One-Adult Households Only)
  MEDM CPFO ptimal Tax Rate
First-best $0.77 1 $0.77
(partial equilibrium)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.01 $0.76
(separable & homothetic) (0.99 1.03) ($0.74 $0.78)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.01 $0.87
(separable, nonhomothetic) (0.99 1.03) ($0.83 $0.92)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.01 $0.82
(nonseparable, nonhomothetic)  (0.99 1.03) ($0.73 $0.95)
(Two-Adult Households Only)
  MEDM CPFO ptimal Tax Rate
First-best $0.77 1 $0.77
(partial equilibrium)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.03 $0.75
(separable & homothetic) (1.00 1.05) ($0.73 $0.77)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.03 $1.01
(separable, nonhomothetic) (1.00 1.05) ($0.66 $3.30)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.03 $1.30
(nonseparable, nonhomothetic)  (1.00 1.05) ($0.82 $5.34)
(All Households)
  MEDM CPFO ptimal Tax Rate
First-best $0.77 1 $0.77
(partial equilibrium)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.02 $0.75
(separable & homothetic) (1.00 1.04) ($0.74 $0.77)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.02 $0.93
(separable, nonhomothetic) (1.00 1.04) ($0.84 $1.18)
 
Second-best $0.77 1.02 $1.04
(nonseparable, nonhomothetic)  (1.00 1.04) ($0.87 $1.48)
All monetary values are in 1997 dollars.  Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses,
based on 1500 replications of a nonparametric clustered bootstrap. Marginal external damage (MED)
includes congestion and accident damages as well as environmental damages.  MED estimates are taken
from Parry and Small (2002) and deflated from 2000 to 1997 dollars.A-1
Appendix 1:  Derivations and Elasticity Formulas
Derivation of Equation (14)
It is useful first to find expressions for how τL and T change for a change in τY.  Taking a


















To derive an expression for the aggregate change in utility from a change in τY, take the
total derivative of utility (1) with respect to τY, sum over households, substitute in the first-
order conditions (10) and a total derivative of the consumer budget constraint (3) with respect to
τY, and rearrange terms.  Note that (14) is a “non-environmental” definition of the MCPF, so we



























To derive an expression for the change in government revenue from a change in τY, take
the total derivative of the left-hand side of the government budget constraint (8) with respect to
τY and rearrange terms.  Because (14) is a “non-environmental” MCPF, we ignore the revenue
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Dividing (A2) by (A3) and then substituting in (A1) and (3) give (14).
Derivation of Equation (15)




 depends on how the income tax adjusts to hold government
revenue constant.  Taking a total derivative of the government budget constraint (8), substituting
























































(A1) and (A4) yields equation (15).
Demand Derivatives in Terms of Estimated Parameters
The demand system used in this paper does not directly yield estimates of derivatives or
elasticities of demand; instead, these derivatives and elasticities are functions of the estimated























h + log pk











h  and then converting the share into a quantity yields an expression
for the uncompensated derivative of demand for good i with respect to the price of good j (where









































h is the quantity of good j consumed and dij is the Kronecker delta, equal to 1 if i=j and
zero otherwise.





























It is then straightforward to use the Slutsky equation to obtain the compensated







































where the subscript C denotes a compensated derivative.
Correcting Derivatives for Corner Solutions
The expressions in (A7-A9) are valid for a household that is at an interior solution, but
not for those at corner solutions (i.e., those households who don’t consume gasoline, or where
one or both adults do not work).  The parameter estimates should still be valid for these
households (because of the corrections for selectivity described in Appendix 2), but the
expressions for derivatives in terms of the estimated parameters will differ.  We follow the
standard “virtual price” approach, recognizing that a household at a corner will have a shadow
price for the good that it is not consuming (or, in the case of leisure, that it is consuming its entire
endowment of) that differs from the true price, as a result of the constraint imposed by the
corner.  This implies that if a household is constrained in its consumption of good k then
(A10)


























where the “hat” denotes the derivative after correcting for the corner solution.  Similarly,
(A11)


























Because consumption of good k is constrained, derivatives of demand for good k, or with respect
to the price of good k will equal zero.
27  It is then straightforward to apply the Slutsky equation
to obtain uncompensated derivatives (recognizing that the income effect for leisure will differ,
because the household starts with an endowment of leisure).
Aggregating Elasticities
We report aggregate elasticities in Tables 4 and 5 to clarify what is driving the optimal tax
                                                
27 If a household is at a corner solution for two goods, then this approach can be applied sequentially for the two
goods.A-4
results.  Thus, it is necessary to aggregate individual household demand derivatives to obtain
aggregate elasticities.  In doing this, we calculate the elasticity for a case in which each household
faces the same absolute change in price.
28  This implies that the aggregate demand elasticity is
given by



















(note that this is the same average price that is used in computing the price index in (22).  The
equations for aggregate labor supply elasticities differ slightly, in that the quantities in (A12) and
(A13) are replaced with the amount of labor supplied.
                                                
28 The reported elasticities are obviously somewhat sensitive to this assumption–because households initially face
different prices, an equal-percentage change in price would give a slightly different result–and it is not entirely clear
which assumption would be more appropriate.  Fortunately, this has no effect on the optimal tax results, because
the optimal tax formula in (16) is calculated using individual household demand derivatives, not aggregates.A-5
 Appendix 2:  Correcting for Selectivity Bias
This section explains corrections made for potential selection into work and into gasoline
consumption. Results for the estimation discussed here are available from the authors by request.
1. The work decision
Since we do not observe wages for individuals who are not working, we follow Heckman
(1979) to correct for the associated selectivity bias and obtain estimated selectivity-corrected net
wages for workers and nonworkers. First we specify a probit of the choice to work or not work.
We obtain the predicted inverse Mills ratio for each individual from the probit to include in an
equation that estimates net wages. Rather than estimate the selection model in two separate
stages, we estimate the probit and net wage regression jointly using full information maximum
likelihood.
We estimate selection models separately for the one-adult and two-adult households, and
within those samples, separately for men and for women. The one-adult probits include age, age
squared, education, race, marital status, number of children, region, the log of gas price, the log of
other good price, and state-specific quarterly unemployment rates.
29 The two-adult probits
contain the variables in the one-adult probits plus partner’s earnings and partner’s demographic
information.
Because of the linear approximation to the price index (22), wages affect the price
derivatives of demand even for non-workers (though this effect is minimal), and thus we need to
predict wages for non-workers as well as for workers.  Because occupation is an important
determinant of net wage but is observed only for workers, we run two selection models for each
subsample, one to estimate workers’ net wages and the other to estimate nonworkers’ net wages.
Within each subsample (where one such subsample, for example, is composed of women from
one-adult households) both the selection models use the same set of observations of workers and
nonworkers and identical probits. We use different wage regressions, however, to estimate net
wages for workers and for nonworkers. To estimate net wages for nonworkers we specify a wage
equation that includes education, age, age squared, race, marital status, region, and the inverse
                                                
29 Unemployment rates are gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov.A-6
Mills ratio from the probits. To estimate net wages for workers, we include those same variables
plus occupation indicators. Since net wages are distributed log normal, we define the dependent
variable as the log of net wage. We calculate predicted net wages for workers to include in demand
system estimation.
In principle, the Heckman selection model is identified even when the variables in the
probit and the wage regression are the same. In that case, the model is identified by its functional
form and the normality assumption. Note, however, that the probits include number of children,
the log of gas price, the log of the other good price, state-specific quarterly unemployment rates,
and, in the case of two-adult households, partner’s earnings; the wage equations do not.  Number
of children affects the fixed cost of working and thus the participation decision. But we do not
expect number of children to affect the wage, since we control for age, race, and gender; number of
children is a standard exclusion restriction in the labor supply literature. Our demand system
allows gas and other good prices to affect the continuous demand for leisure and thus it is
reasonable to assume that they also affect the discrete work choice. While high price regions may
also be high wage regions, there is no reason to postulate that an individual facing a high gas price
or other good price will have a higher wage, since we control for region in our wage equation.
Unemployment rates proxy for job availability in a state and thus affect the likelihood of
working, but it is not clear why they would affect wages. Partner's earnings proxy for an
individual's nonwage income, but should not directly affect an individual's wage; this is another
standard exclusion restriction.
2. The gasoline decision
Since some households have zero expenditure on gasoline, another selection bias may
arise. Heien and Wessels (1990) proposes a procedure for dealing with households that consume
none of a good. They estimate a probit of the dichotomous choice to consume or not consume a
particular good and obtain inverse Mills ratios defined in Heckman (1979). They include these
inverse Mills ratios in all equations of the demand system.A-7
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999), however, finds that especially in the case of a large number of
censored observations, the Heien and Wessels procedure is biased. They recommend an
alternative unbiased approach that still allows for the demand system to be estimated over all
households. However, we cannot use the approach suggested by Shonkwiler and Yen, because we
need to use instrumental variables to estimate our system, and their approach would yield
inconsistent estimates if used along with instrumental variables.
Like Heien and Wessels (1990), we use the results of the probit on the dichotomous
choice to consume or not consume gasoline to calculate an inverse Mills ratio for each household.
We run separate probits for one-adult and two-adult households. Each probit includes the log of
total goods expenditures, age, age squared, race, marital status, the number of children, region, an
indicator for whether the household owns its house, and the logs of gas price and other good
price. Demographic variables for both adults are included in the two-adult probit. Home
ownership acts as a proxy for wealth and access to credit and thus increases the likelihood of
owning an automobile and the likelihood of consuming gasoline (see West, 2004). We do not
expect it to affect the continuous choice of gasoline and we therefore use it as an exclusion
restriction.
Also like Heien and Wessels (1990), we include the inverse Mills ratio from the discrete
gas choice in all equations of our demand system. We, however, estimate the system on only
households that consume gasoline in which all adults work, whereas Heien and Wessels
estimated the system for all households, not just those that consume positive amounts of all
goods.  In their case, it was particularly important to keep all households in the system
estimation, because they estimated a demand system defined over some goods that the majority
of households did not consume. We lose relatively few households that consume no gasoline; in
the one-adult sample, 510 households buy no gasoline; in the two-adult sample 56 households
buy none. And, by excluding from the estimation households that do not consume gasoline, we
avoid the bias noted by Shonkwiler and Yen. In this sense our correction is exactly analogous to
that in Heckman (1979), in which the second stage regression is estimated only over uncensored
households.